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A REGULATORY MODEL FOR GENETIC
TESTING IN EMPLOYMENT
JACK F. WILLIAMS*
[W]hile the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate
he becomes a mathematical certainty. You can, for example,
never foretell what any one man will do, but you can say with
precision what an average number will be up to. Individuals vary,
but percentages remain constant. So says the statistician.'
Discrimination in employment based on a person's race or sex is generally
unlawful. However, if an individual's genotype indicates that he is hyper-
susceptible to an occupational illness in a given job, will that justify a refusal
to hire him solely on the basis of his immutable genetic constitution? Will the
hypersusceptible employee have the right to decide to continue his employ-
ment even though such conduct would increase the risk of occupational ill-
ness? If so, will the worker's employer be shielded from potential liability?
To further cloud the issue, will it matter that many genetic "deficiencies"
tend to fall along racial and ethnic lines? These are but a smattering of the
many complex ethical and legal questions that are associated with the emer-
ging technology of genetic testing in the workplace.
Advocates of genetic testing argue that the new technology will prove
useful in reducing occupational illness.2 Through the use of such tests, cer-
tain job applicants or employees predisposed to specific types of occupa-
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* U.S. Coast Guard Academy; B.A., University of Oklahoma; J.D. with high honors,
George Washington University National Law Center. The author currently serves as a law clerk
to the Hon. William J. Holloway, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit.
The author wishes to thank Robert E. Bacharach for his helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this article.-Ed.
1. A. CONAN DOYLE, The Sign of Four, in THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK HOLMES 610, 666
(W.S. Baring-Gould ed. 1967) (statement by Sherlock Holmes to Dr. Watson, of course).
2. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., THE ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN
THE PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 5 (1983) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
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tional illness can be identified. Preventive measures can then be directed at
those individuads to reduce the risk of occupational illness. Not only could
job-related health risks be reduced for individual workers but costs might be
cut for medical care, insurance premiums, and time lost from work., This is
the promise of genetic testing. The concern, however, is that genetic tests
could be used to unfairly exclude applicants or employees from employment.
To the employer genetic testing manifests itself as a two-edged sword.
Employers fear, on the one hand, that any use of genetic tests may leave
them vulnerable to state and federal discrimination suits. On the other hand,
employers fear that they will be found negligent if they ignore genetic testing
results and assign a hypersusceptible employee to a high-risk job, or fail to
conduct the tests at all."
Critics of genetic testing in the workplace fear the tests will be used to un-
fairly exclude applicants and employees. They argue that the use of genetic
tests will result in invidious discrimination creating a new class of undesirable
workers.' Nevertheless, scientists view genetic testing as an exciting
technology still in its infancy. To them, the vast potential of genetic testing
appears boundless. The experts are careful to assert, however, that at this
time many of the tests do not meet established scientific criteria for routine
use in employment. 6
Genetic Testing
Genetic testing in the workplace encompasses two types of pro-
cedures-genetic monitoring and genetic screening. Genetic monitoring in-
volves periodic examinations of an employee to assess any change in his
genetic material.7 Through the use of genetic monitoring, an employer can
learn of the need to lower exposure levels of certain toxins found in the
3. Each year approximately 390,000 workers contract occupational illnesses. See Dentzer, et
al., Can You Pass the Job Test?, NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1986, at 53. Occupational illnesses cost the
U.S. economy more than 850,000 work days in 1981. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. See also
Goodrich, Are Your Genes Right For Your Job, 3 CALIF. LAW., May 1983, at 24, 25-26;
English, Genetic Tests for Jobs Stir Hopes and Fears, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 1983,
at 72; Appelson, Genes and Jobs, 68 A.B.A. J. 1061 (1982).
4. Field, Biological Monitoring and Genetic Screening in the Industrial Workplace: A
Synopsis and Analysis, 11 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE, June 1983, at 125, 125-26.
5. Id.
6. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10. Chairman Albert Gore has concluded that
genetic testing is "tentative and premature." Genetic Screening of Workers: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Science & Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (June 1982) (statement of Albert
Gore, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight) [hereinafter June 1982 Hear-
ing]. See generally Research Group on Ethical, Social & Legal Issues on Genetic Counseling &
Genetic Eng'g of the Inst. of Society, Ethics & the Life Sciences, Ethical and Social Issues in
Screening for Genetic Disease, 286 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1129, 1130 (1972) (before screening pro-
grams are implemented the test must be valid, reliable, and predictive).
7. See M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 52 (1984); June 1982 Hearing,
supra note 6, at 3-8 (statement of Gretchen Kolsrud). See generally OTA REPORT, supra note 2,
at 67-80. Professor Rothstein's work is a valuable source for those interested in this topic.
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workplace and can identify substances that may increase the risk of contract-
ing occupational illnesses for the entire work force.8
Genetic screening, however, is a one-time test to determine an employee's
susceptibility to a given illness.' This determination is based on the presence
or absence of certain genetic traits in an individual's genotype, regardless of
whether the individual has been exposed to a hazardous substance. The tell-
ing genetic traits can usually be identified through laboratory tests on blood
or a variety of other body fluids.' 0 The traits identified by genetic screening,
while normally not harmful, theoretically may make an individual more
susceptible to an occupational illness." However, a cautionary note must be
sounded: Genetic screening measures potential susceptibility but does not
predict future illness. Therefore, it is possible to possess a genetic predisposi-
tion to a specific illness yet never contract the illness.
Genetic screening has the potential to determine an individual's sensitivity
to certain hazardous agents in the workplace. However, before genetic
screening can be justified in employment, the tests must be scientifically ac-
ceptable. It is axiomatic that legal acceptability must necessarily be
predicated upon scientific acceptability. Any use of the tests in employment
is unjustified if the tests are not scientifically acceptable.
There is vigorous debate among the experts as to the validity and reliability
of genetic testing as a means of discerning applicants and employees possess-
ing genetic hypersusceptibility to certain occupational diseases. Experts agree
that as a means of testing the work force generally, existing genetic tests are
not proven predictors of occupational illness.'" Nevertheless, genetic tests ap-
pear to be valid and reliable predictors of future occupational illness when
applied to subgroups of the work force already suspected of having the trait
at a relatively high rate.13 A thorough exploration of the scientific acceptabil-
ity of the various genetic tests is beyond the focus of this article. Presently,
there is no legal mechanism by which to judge the validity and reliability of
genetic tests."
8. Sweltz, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: An Analysis of the Legal Implications, 19
FORUM 323, 324 (1984).
9. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52; OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 89-101.
10. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 53. Several sources of body fluids are available, but
usually blood, urine, and feces have been used in genetic tests. Only blood serves as an easily ob-
tainable source of body fluid for genetic tests. Id. at 54. Genetic tests can be made on blood ob-
tained from a preemployment examination without the individual's knowledge of the tests.
Moreover, an individual generally cannot refuse medical tests without the possibility of being
fired. See, e.g., Gargiul v. Tompkins, 525 F. Supp. 795, 798 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (there is no con-
stitutional or common law right to refuse a medical exam), rev'd on other grounds, 704 F.2d
661, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1983). See also M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 88-89.
11. See Diamond, Genetic Testing in Employment Situations, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 231, 242
(1983).
12. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
13. Id.
14. This statement is qualified. Courts, when confronted with novel scientific issues, gen-
erally turn to what is called the Frye doctrine, named for the case where the doctrine was first ex-
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Scientists have developed several types of genetic tests for detecting hyper-
susceptible individuals. Three of the biogenetic tests illustrate the novel legal
issues of genetic screening. One test screens for the glucose-6-phosphate
dehydrogenase (G-6-PD) deficiency. The G-6-PD deficiency is a biochemical
genetic condition involving the red blood cells.'" G-6-PD is the initial enzyme
in the energy-generating process where glucose is oxidized. The deficiency in
the enzyme interferes with the energy-generating process.' 6 Exposure to
several chemicals theoretically may cause clinically significant hemolytic
anemia. These chemicals include ozone, copper, sodium nitrite, aromatic
nitro and amino compounds, and lead and its compounds. 7 The G-6-PD
deficiency is a trait found in approximately 16 percent of American black
males, 13 percent of Filipinos, and 11 percent of Mediterranean Jews.'" In
contrast, the G-6-PD deficiency is found in only one of every one thousand
American whites.19
Another genetic deficiency detectable by screening is the sickle-cell trait.
The sickle-cell trait is the presence of an abnormal protein found in approx-
imately 8 percent of American blacks.20 While those with sickle-cell anemia
are known to have a reduced life span, the health hazards of possessing the
sickle-cell trait are considered minimal by some scientists. 2' Nevertheless,
other scientists have suggested that an individual should be tested for the
sickle-cell trait where taxing work is required in high altitudes or other areas
of limited oxygen. 22 An employer may decide to bar those classes of ap-
plicants or workers with the sickle-cell trait from employment that involves
the handling of benzene, lead, or nitro and amino compounds so as to pro-
tect those individuals from chemically induced anemia or some other
illness. 23
plicated, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For several proposals to
modify or abolish the Frye doctrine, see generally 26 JURIMErics 236-65 (1986).
15. M. RomSTrEIN, supra note 7, at 55.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 56. See also Reinhardt, Chemical Hypersusceptibility, 20 J. Occ. MED. 319, 320-21
(1978) (an employer should not permit individuals with G-6-PD deficiency to work with nitro
and amino compounds).
18. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 90. The first suggestions that G-6-PD deficiency may be
involved in worker susceptibility to chemically induced anemia occurred in the 1960s. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 91. For a helpful article on how blood is genetically tested for the sickle-cell trait,
see Clark, Gosnell, Shapiro & Hager, Medicine: A Brave New World, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5, 1984,
at 64, 65.
21. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 91.
22. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 54-55. The sickle-cell trait was blamed for four deaths in
Army recruits in basic training at high altitudes. Jones, et al., Sudden Death in Sickle-Cell Trait,
282 NEW ENG. J. MED. 323, 323-25 (1970). In the past, the Air Force excluded blacks with the
sickle-cell trait from the Air Force Academy and flight training. 17 U.S. MED. 24, 24-25 (1981).
23. See Stokinger & Scheel, Hypersusceptibility and Genetic Problems in Occupational
Medicine-A Consensus Report, 15 J. Occ. MED. 564, 572 (1973) (individuals with the sickle-
cell trait face increased high risks when exposed to benzene, lead, amino, and nitro compounds).
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Finally, an individual identified with heterozygous serum alpha antitryp-
sin (SAT) deficiency is more susceptible to pulmonary ailments such as em-
physema and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and, thus, should avoid
exposure to respiratory irritants." The SAT deficiency is found most fre-
quently in Northern and Central Europeans.
Controversy has arisen over the use of genetic screening in employment.
According to a 1982 Office of Technology Assessment survey on the possible
use of genetic screening by the nation's largest industries, public utilities, and
unions, fifty-nine corporations reported they would begin some form of
genetic screening within the next five years; seventeen reported they had
previously used genetic screening; and six reported they used it currently. 21
There is a good possibility that the survey may have underreported the use of
genetic screening in the United States. 26 The biogenetic test that appeared to
have been the most often used by employers in the past has been the test for
the sickle-cell trait.2 7 The extent and possible future use of genetic screening
has caught the scientific and legal communities by surprise.
Existing Legal Framework
Genetic screening generates novel legal issues related to employer duties,
employee rights, and safety in the workplace. Presently, there are no federal
statutes addressing the use of genetic screening in employment. Moreover,
there are no cases that have decided genetic screening issues. However, there
is an existing legal framework that may be applicable to the issues raised by
the use of genetic screening in employment.
This article examines the applicability of the collective bargaining process
and several federal statutes to the emerging genetic testing technology. 28 The
24. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 93; Reinhardt, supra note 17, at 321.
25. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-40. See also June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 2-43.
The "59 corporations" number should be elaborated on. The number represents those com-
panies who may possibly consider the use of genetic testing in the future. Genetic Screening in
the Workplace: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight of the House
Comm. on Science & Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (Oct. 1982) (statement of Geoffrey
Karny, Project Director, Biological Applications Program, OTA) [hereinafter Oct. 1982 Hear-
ing].
26. The use of genetic testing in the employment process is controversial and many
employers may not have been candid with the survey. One industry trade group reportedly tried
to raise suspicions among its members by falsely stating that the OTA survey was not
anonymous. June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 40.
27. Goodrich, supra note 3, at 27. The test for the sickle-cell trait has been performed on
black employees at DuPont. See Severo, Screening of Blacks by DuPont Sharpens Debate on
Gene Tests, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at 21, col. 5.
28. The use of the collective bargaining process and the several federal statutes is illustrative
of the problems associated with using traditional precedent to address the novel issues generated
by genetic screening. By no means should the examples be construed as exhaustive. For example,
Professor Rothstein explores the application of common law rules, the worker's compensation
laws, and tort laws to the genetic testing area. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 81-93, 168-90.
Moreover, a section 1983 civil rights suit may also be a remedy for discrimination on account of
an individual's genotype. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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article presents an overview of the complexity of the issues and the need for
reasoned legislative action. Some of the more important issues associated
with genetic screening will be raised along with several proposals to deal with
those issues. The article concludes that the existing legal framework is not
capable of satisfactorily resolving the novel issues generated by the use of
genetic screening in employment. The existing legal framework, therefore,
must be amended to specifically address the issues presented by this emerging
technology.
The Collective Bargaining Process
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) creates a complex structure of
duties within which labor and management must fit themselves. 29 The NLRA
grants employees the right to organize into unions and to bargain with their
employers over wages, hours, and conditions of employment."
A union can insist on bargaining only over mandatory conditions of
employmen. 3' Whether a condition of employment is mandatory depends on
its practical effect and not merely its form.3 2 Moreover, whether a subject
should be included within the scope of mandatory bargaining is generally
determined in light of national labor policy. 3"
A subject is mandatory only if it settles an aspect of the relationship be-
tween the employer and his employees. 3 Such subject must also possess a
substantial impact on the collective bargaining relationship. The determina-
tion that genetic testing is a mandatory condition of employment is necessary
before a union can insist on collective bargaining. If the use of genetic testing
is viewed as a mandatory condition of employment, then the employer may
not unilaterally change the terms and conditions of genetic testing without
first granting the union an opportunity to bargain. 3 However, if the use of
genetic testing is viewed as a nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining,
then an employer is free to bargain or not with the union.1 6
Health and safety matters are considered mandatory conditions of employ-
ment within the scope of the collective bargaining process. 3 Thus, an
employer's unilateral changes in a health care plan have been held to violate
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
30. See id. § 158(d).
31. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). See also Brockway Motor Trucks v.
NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1978).
32. See Technicolor Gov't Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1984).
33. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1964). See also
NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 38, 575 F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 1978).
34. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 575 F.2d at 397.
35. See K.'tz, 369 U.S. at 743. See also NLRB v. Henry Vogt Mach. Co., 718 F.2d 802, 806
(6th Cir. 1983); Capitol-Husting Co. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 237, 246 (7th Cir. 1982).
36. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 575 F.2d at 398.
37. NLRB v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 778 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3274 (1986); NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967). Accord M. ROTHSIN,
supra note 7, at 150.
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the NLRA. 38 Genetic testing is essentially a matter of employee health and
safety. Genetic testing must then be viewed as a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining. Such a conclusion promotes the basic purpose of the NLRA,
which is to encourage the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes. 39
Employers and unions could negotiate solutions to the problems generated
by genetic screening and incorporate those solutions in a collective bargaining
agreement. A sampling of the problems the employer and the union may
address are how to judge the accuracy of the tests, how the tests are to be
used, which employees are to be tested, and whether an employee may refuse
to take the tests. The agreement may also address such problems as who is to
pay for the tests, who will have access to the test results, and to what extent
the results will remain confidential.
There are several virtues in resorting to the collective bargaining process in
addressing the issues raised by genetic screening. Implementing this proposal
is not difficult. The collective bargaining process is already well structured,
and a significant body of case law has delineated many of the rights and
obligations of the parties. Moreover, the use of the collective bargaining pro-
cess to address the problems raised by genetic screening does not involve
direct action by the government. The answers to the problems raised by the
use of the tests are left to the bargaining process. Thus, experience and the
marketplace direct the path of the genetic testing technology. With time and
experience, unions may discover whether genetic screening is an important
issue to its members and can react accordingly. Experience, not government,
will mold the path of genetic screening.
The pitfalls of resorting to the collective bargaining process to address the
questions posed by genetic screening are many. First, unions' ability to effectively
deal with noneconomic issues is limited. The collective bargaining process, as a
practical matter, tends to focus on wages, hours, benefits, and job security.40
Safety and health concerns traditionally have not been of great import to
either the employer or the rank-and-file employees.4'
Second, genetic testing has been a secretive technology.42 To adequately
represent its members, unions must be informed of the advances of genetic
testing. Unions do have a recognized interest in knowing what risks its
members face so that informed collective bargaining can occur. 3 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has stated that employers must "provide information that
38. See Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 729 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 984 (1981).
39. See Brockway Motor Trucks, 582 F.2d at 727.
40. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 154-56; OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 131; Genetic
Screening and Handling of High-Risk Groups in the Workplace: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Investigation & Oversight of the House Comm. on Science & Technology, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 36 (Oct. 1981) [hereinafter Oct. 1981 Hearing].
41. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 154-55; OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 131.
42. Goodrich, supra note 3, at 59.
43. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 358-59
(D.C. Cir. 1983). See also M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 89-94.
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is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its
duties.""' The employer's duty is predicated on the union's need for infor-
mation, which enables the union to intelligently and knowingly represent its
employees. 5 The goals of occupational health and safety are adequately pro-
moted if employers fully share with unions any available information on
working conditions and employee medical histories. 6 However, whether
unions have the political clout or resources substantial enough to pierce the
veil of secrecy cloaking the use of genetic testing by employers in the past is
as yet unknown.
Third, although unions may bargain over the use of genetic tests, they have
no legal duty to do so.47 A union may waive its right to bargain over a man-
datory subject, but such waiver must be clear.4'8 Any union decision of
whether to protect hypersusceptible employees would be based on many fac-
tors, including the number of employees involved, the nature of the risk, the
state of the economy, and the relative strength of the union's bargaining
power.4 9
Fourth, although a collective bargaining agreement may address company
medical practices, it generally does not address preemployment examinations
or the employer's hiring process.5 0 Traditionally, these procedures have been
within the employer's prerogative. Thus, one possible abuse of genetic
screening-its use to screen out job applicants-is not addressed by the col-
lective bargaining process. There is also a problem with those workers who
are not members of any union. A union cannot compel an employer to
bargain over the terms of employment for employees it does not represent."
Presently, only 20 percent of all workers are unionized. 2
Finally, the collective bargaining agreement by nature is an agreement be-
tween the employer and the union. Genetic screening, however, is a
44. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967). See also Holyoke Water Power
Co., 778 F.2d at 51.
45. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 358-59. Moreover, the union's right of
access to information "is not dependent upon the existence of some particular controversy or the
need to dispose of some recognized problem." Id. at 361. See also Holyoke Water Power Co.,
778 F.2d at 51.
46. An employer does have a substantial interest in protecting the confidentiality of
employees' records, and the employee has a right to privacy in his medical records. Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 363. These interests, however, cannot become a barrier to cloak
relevant information from the union. Rather, the employer must generally permit union access
to relevant information but should delete any information that could reasonably be used to
identify specific employees. Id.
47. OTA RETORT, supra note 2, at 131.
48. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 247, 256 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981). A union can waive its right to bargain over a mandatory subject if it has notice
of the issue and fails to protest or demand bargaining on the issue. Henry Vogt Mach. Co., 718
F.2d at 806. Waiver will generally not be presumed. Technicolor Gov't Serv., 739 F.2d at 328.
49. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 131.
50. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 159; June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 104.
51. United Food & Comm'l Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th
Cir. 1984).
52. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 132.
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technology that transcends the parties to the collective bargaining agreement.
The public has an interest in how this technology is performed and inter-
preted.53 Moreover, resorting to collective bargaining would lead to
nonuniform results in handling genetic screening. Thus, collective bargaining
alone is inadequate to deal with the many complex issues presented by the use
of genetic screening in the workplace.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act
The Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act was enacted by Congress
in 1970 to ensure that every working person in the United States is employed
in a safe workplace .5  "It is the only comprehensive statute addressed to
hazards in the workplace and therefore is the primary vehicle for hazard
elimination. '"55 The Act in its "statement of findings and declarations of pur-
pose and policy" declares that its purpose is "to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions and to preserve our human resources. ' 56 This statement of pur-
pose and policy must be considered in construing other provisions of the
OSH Act. Any violation of the OSH Act by an employer can result in assess-
ment of both civil and criminal penalties against the employer. 57
The OSH Act is silent on the use of genetic testing. The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has officially opposed the use of
genetic testing in the workplace, stating that the workplace must be safe for
all workers.58 Opponents of genetic testing argue that the use of the tests
would shift the burden of maintaining a safe workplace from employers to
employees by keeping hypersusceptible workers from jobs that they are
otherwise qualified to perform.5 There is the fear that instead of eliminating
hazards to make working conditions safe for all, many employers will simply
exclude hypersusceptible workers.
The OSH Act imposes two separate duties on employers. Each employer is
charged with the general duty to furnish employment and places of employ-
ment "free from recognized hazards that are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm." ' 60 Furthermore, each employer must comply with specific oc-
53. The use of genetic screening in employment has societal ramifications. Cf. Gildiner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (society has an interest in
ensuring that genetic testing, e.g., amniocentesis, is properly performed and interpreted). This is
especially true where the tests are used to unfairly exclude individuals from employment. Society
has an interest in protecting its members from such abuses.
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
55. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 95.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982).
57. Id. § 666.
58. See Note, Genetic Testing in Employment: Employee Protection or Threat?, 15 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1187, 1209-10 (1981). Cf. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 98 (OSHA has stated that
carcinogen standard does not require genetic testing; however, genetic testing is not prohibited).
59. See, e.g., Field, supra note 4, at 126.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). Section 654(a)(1) has been held not to be unconstitutionally
vague. See, e.g., Ensign-Bickford Co. v. OSHRC, 717 F.2d 1419, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984).
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cupational safety and health standards promulgated under the OSH Act. 61
The OSH Act's general duty clause provides: "(a) Each employer-(1)
shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employ-
ment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." ' 62 The general duty
clause was intended as a pragmatic provision to cover dangerous conditions
of employment not specifically covered by existing health and safety stan-
dards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under the OSH Act.63 In deter-
mining what constitutes a recognized hazard, the federal courts and the Oc-,
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) have employed
various tests. 4
A recognized hazard has been defined generally as one that is known to the
employer or generally recognized as a hazard in the particular industry. 6
What constitutes a recognized hazard rests on an objective determination.
Thus, an employer need not actually be aware of the hazard. 66 A recognized
hazard can be proved by demonstrating an employer's actual or constructive
knowledge of the specific hazard or by resorting to general industry
practice.6 7 Whether an employer had actual or constructive knowledge of a
hazard is a question of fact; thus, the reviewing court will not disturb the
OSHRC's Finding if "supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole.""
The courts will often look to an employer's safety program in determining
whether he had actual knowledge of a hazard. In Puffer's Hardware, Inc. v.
Donovan,6 the First Circuit held that it was reasonable to infer from the
presence of an employer's safety program that he was aware of the hazard.70
An employer's constructive knowledge can generally be demonstrated by
showing his familiarity and experience with dangerous conditions, re-
quirements of state and local law, and the implementation of a safety pro-
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1982). The Secretary of Labor is authorized to set "occupa-
tional safety and health standards," defined as standards requiring "conditions, or the adoption
or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary
or appropriale to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment." Id. §
652(8).
62. Id. § 554(a)(1) (emphasis added).
63. See Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1981). See
also Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86
HARV. L. REv. 988, 990 (1973).
64. For a collection of cases showing the various tests employed by the courts and OSHRC,
see Annotation, What Is "Recognized Hazard" Within Meaning of General Duty Clause of Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C.S. § 654(a)(1)), 50 A.L.R. Fed. 742, 745-46 (1980).
65. Id. at 745.
66. See Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 1981).
67. See, e.g., Magma Copper Co. v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1979).
68. Donovan v. General Motors Corp., 764 F.2d 32, 35 (lst Cir. 1985) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
660(a) (1982)).
69. 742 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 18. See also General Motors Corp., 764 F.2d at 36; Annotation, supra note 64, at
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gram. 7 If actual or constructive knowledge is sufficiently shown, there is
generally no need to resort to industry practice.72
A recognized hazard can also be shown to exist by reference to actual in-
dustry practice. 73 However, merely because an industry has not recognized
and addressed a particular hazard does not foreclose a court's inquiry. Ac-
tual industry practice does not necessarily set the standard of care required
by the OSH Act.7"
In complying with the general duty clause, an employer is not required to
provide an absolutely safe working environment. The clause is tempered by
the statement of purpose and policy in section 651(b) "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions.' 7
One is hard pressed to argue that an employer has a general duty to imple-
ment the use of genetic testing in employment. The first obstacle is OSHA's
official stance opposing the use of genetic tests. The second obstacle is in-
herent in the tests themselves. Since the reliability of the tests is not scien-
tifically acceptable, an employer's failure to use them will not be viewed as a
recognized hazard.76 -M oreover, contemporary industry practice does not in-
clude a genetic testing policy.
A separate question is whether the general duty clause prohibits the use of
genetic screening. As Professor Rothstein cogently notes, "The second pos-
sible use of [the general duty clause], to prohibit certain medical practices,
has already been attempted, 7 7 and the attempt has failed. In Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers International Union v. American Cyanamid Co.,7 the
District of Columbia Circuit was faced with the question of whether an
employer's policy, which "provided that women employees of childbearing
age could not hold jobs that exposed them to toxic substances at levels con-
sidered unsafe for fetuses" including the exception "made for women who
could show that they had been surgically sterilized," 79 constituted a hazard
under the general duty clause. The D.C. Circuit held that the employer's
policy was not a hazard, finding "that the general duty clause does not apply
to a policy as contrasted with a physical condition in the workplace." 80
The general duty clause notwithstanding, the essence of the OSH Act
statutory scheme is that employees are required to comply with all duly pro-
71. See Annotation, supra note 64, at 752-55, for a collection of cases on this subject.
72. See Brennan v. OSHRC, 494 F.2d 460, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1974).
73. See Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 649 F.2d at 101.
74. See Donovan v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 674 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1982); National
Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982) (emphasis added). See also Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
76. Accord M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 108.
77. Id. at 108 (emphasis in original).
78. 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 445.
80. Id. at 448.
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mulgated standards.' Section 654(b) provides: "(b) Each employee shall
comply with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regula-
tions, and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which are applicable to his
own actions and conduct." 82 The OSH Act requires the Secretary of Labor
to adopt any national consensus standard83 and any established federal stan-
dard84 as an occupational safety or health standard.85 The OSH Act also em-
powers the Secretary to promulgate, modify, or revoke standards." The
OSH Act further provides that in promulgating standards on toxic materials
or harmful physical agents, the Secretary
shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. 7
Pursuant to the OSH Act, the Secretary could require the use of genetic
testing in the workplace when the procedures are proved accurate. However,
any genetic testing standard must be tempered with a requirement that the
standard be feasible. The feasibility requirement has been construed to em-
body the concept that the OSH Act was not designed to provide an absolute-
ly safe workplace but was designed to eliminate significant harm.88
The feasibility requirement under the OSH Act is two-dimensional. It re-
quires the Secretary to assess the technological and economic feasibility of a
proposed s;tandard. A large body of case law has been generated by the
feasibility Tequirement.
81. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 103.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1982).
83. A "national consensus standard" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1982) as
any occupational safety and health standard or modification thereof which (1) has
been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing
organization under procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that
persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have
reached ,ubstantial agreement on its adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner
which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be considered and (3) has been
designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consultation with other ap-
propriate Federal agencies.
84. An "established Federal standard" is defined as "any operative occupational safety and
health standard established by any agency or the United States and presently in effect, or con-
tained in any Act of Congress in force on December 29, 1970 [the date of enactment of the OSH
Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1982).
85. Where a conflict exists between a national consensus standard and an established federal
standard, the Secretary of Labor must employ the standard that assures employees the greatest
protection. See id. § 655(10).
86. Id. § 655(b). The procedures require that the Secretary of Labor make his determination
on the basis of written information submitted to him by employers, employees, NIOSH, or an
advisory committee appointed by the Secretary. See id. § 655(b)(1).
87. Id. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added).
88. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Pet. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(the Benzene care).
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Technological feasibility means something more than a perusal of the
technological status quo. Technological feasibility under the OSH Act can be
"technology-forcing." 8 9 As a practical matter, OSHA can require an in-
dustry to conduct research and development to acquire technology pre-
sently on the scientific horizon.90 Moreover, OSHA can impose a stan-
dard that only the most technologically advanced plants in an industry can
achieve. 91
To prove a proposed standard is technologically feasible, OSHA must
show that modern technology has at least conceived some industrial strategies
or devices that are likely to be capable of meeting the standard and which are
generally capable of adoption by the industry.92 Presently, genetic testing has
not been proved to be a scientifically acceptable device. Before the tests are
technologically feasible, they must be proved accurate and reliable. Thus,
OSHA would probably fail in any attempt to prove that the tests are
technologically feasible at this stage of technology development.
The second dimension of the feasibility requirement under the OSH Act is
economic feasibility. Economic feasibility means something more than
whether a proposed standard is financially burdensome. A standard can
threaten the survival of some companies within an industry but cannot im-
peril the existence of the entire industry. 3 The OSH Act, however, does not
require OSHA to engage in a cost-benefit analysis before promulgating a
standard.94 "Congress viewed the costs of health and safety as a cost of do-
ing business.""
To prove that a proposed standard is economically feasible, OSHA must
provide a reasonable assessment of the likely range of costs of its standard,
and the likely effects of those costs on the industry.96 By granting an industry
a reasonable time to comply with a standard, OSHA can enhance the
economic feasibility of a standard. 97 Genetic testing should not entail costs
that would be economically infeasible. Most tests are conducted on blood
samples that can be obtained relatively inexpensively. The tests can be per-
formed by outside laboratories on contract. Interpretation of the tests can be
performed through the existing occupational health structure.
The OSH Act provides an existing statutory scheme to evaluate the ac-
curacy of genetic tests and to implement specific genetic testing programs.
Congress has authorized the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
89. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
90. Id.; Society of Plastic Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (OSHA can force industry to develop and diffuse new technology).
91. See United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at 1274.
92. Id. at 1266.
93. Id. at 1265.
94. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) ("cost-
benefit analysis is not required by the statute because feasibility is").
95. Id. at 520.
96. See United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at 1266.
97. Id. at 1265.
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Health (NIOSH) to identify specific occupational safety and health standards
and to recommend safe exposure levels for particular harmful agents.98
NIOSH also has the power to formulate criteria for determining the accept-
ability of occupational medical tests. 9 Moreover, data on the use of genetic
tests can be compiled pursuant to NIOSH's authority under section 673 of
the OSH Act. 00
Under the OSH Act and its interpretation by the courts, if a genetic test
could determine that an employee would suffer an increased risk of illness
due to working conditions, an employer may be liable for placing the worker
in a high-risk job. An employer's liability may stem from either the general
duty clause or a specific genetic-testing standard. Furthermore, if the tests
were reasonable an employer may be able to use the tests under the Act if he
could show there was no other technology available to ensure a safe and
healthy workplace for certain hypersusceptible employees.' 0'
Nevertheless, the Act is deficient in several major aspects. The Act will not
apply to the use of genetic screening of job applicants-a requirement for
any regulatory scheme addressing the issues of genetic screening. The use of
genetic screening as a means of unfairly excluding job applicants must be
guarded against. Moreover, the Act will not redress employer discrimination
of hypersusceptible workers. 2 Finally, the focus of the Act is on minimum
standards of safety and prevention of harm rather than compensating injured
employees.'0 3 Although the OSH Act was enacted to the benefit of
employees, it does not create a private right of action on behalf of the
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 671(c), (d) (1982). NIOSH also has the statutory authority to publish a list
of all known toxic substances. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 669(a), (b), 671(a) (1982).
99. See Field, supra note 4, at 126.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 673(9) (1982) provides:
In erder to further the purposes of the chapter, the Secretary, in consultation
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall develop and maintain an
effective program of collection, compilation, and analysis of occupational safety
and health statistics. Such program may cover all employments whether or not
subject to any other provisions of this chapter but shall not cover employments ex-
cluded by section 653 of this title. The Secretary shall compile accurate statistics on
work injuries and illnesses which shall include all disabling, serious, or significant
injuries and illnesses, whether or not involving loss of time from work, other than
minor injuries requiring only first aid treatment and which do not involve medical
treatment, loss of consciousness, restriction of work or motion, or transfer to
another job.
101. See Note, supra note 58, at 1211.
102. June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 104-05 (prepared statement by Mark Rothstein, Pro-
fessor of Law, West Virginia University). An employee does receive protection if he is dis.
charged or discriminated against for exercising his rights under the OSH Act. See 29 U.S.C. §
660(c)(1) (1982); Annotation, Prohibition of Discrimination Against, or Discharge of, Employee
Because of Exercise of Right Afforded By Occupational Safety and Health Act, Under § I l(c)(l)
of the Act (29 U.S.C.S. § 660(c)(1)), 66 A.L.R. Fed. 650 (1984). Generally, an employer
discriminates against an employee within the meaning of section 660(c)(1) when the employer
treats that employee less favorably than he treats others similarily situated. See Annotation,
supra, at 655-57; M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 98-99.
103. See generally June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 90-97.
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employee who has been harmed.'"" An employee's only recourse is to petition
the Secretary of Labor to enforce the OSH Act's requirements. Therefore, a
private enforcment mechanism in the statutory scheme is lacking.
Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972,1°5 proscribes discrimination in employment
based on sex, color, race, religion, and national origin. The promise of Title
VII is to provide equal employment opportunities for all individuals
regardless of their immutable characteristics. "The statute's focus on the in-
dividual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class .... Individual
risks, like individual performance, may not be predicted by resort to
classifications, proscribed by Title VII.' '0 6 This is true even where the
generalization about the class is accurate, but the generalization is not ap-
plicable to a specific individual.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as originally enacted in 1964 afforded a
remedy for employment discrimination only to private sector employees. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended Title VII to include
federal, state, and local government employees."0 7
Several different categories of employers are amenable to suit under Title
VII. The Act defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year."'0 0 The requisite number of employees is a mandatory jurisdictional re-
quirement.' 09
An employee may bring a Title VII action against a nonfederal govermen-
tal entity such as a state or local government; however, such suit must be
brought against the defendant in his official capacity. A federal employee
may also bring suit against his employer but must name the head of the
department as the defendant." ' Unions and employment agencies may also
be sued under Title VII. 1' Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
rights of an employee to a de novo trial are not foreclosed by the prior sub-
mission of his claim to arbitration under a nondiscrimination clause of a col-
lective bargaining agreement.1 '
104. Id. at 89. See also United Steel Workers of Am., 647 F.2d at 1235.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
106. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-10 (1978).
107. Title VII also provides protection from discrimination by employment agencies and labor
unions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), (c) (1982).
108. Id. § 2000e(b).
109. See, e.g., Bonomo v. National Duckpin Bowling Cong., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D.
Md. 1979).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982).
111. See id. § 2000e-2(b), (c). See generally Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union
of Am., AFL-CIO, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part, 451 U.S. 77, 88 (1981).
112. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
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An interesting problem arises when a predecessor employer is accused of
discrimination. The courts have generally addressed this problem by embrac-
ing a balancing test that weighs the interest of the employee and the national
policy against discrimination against the current operator who theoretically
has not engaged in discrimination. ' 3 Courts generally hold predecessor
employers liable for Title VII violations when there is a continuity of opera-
tions.114
There are several categories of employees who can bring a suit under Title
VII. After complying with the prelitigation administrative requirements," I an
individual nonfederal employee may bring suit on his own behalf or as a class
representative pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), unless the
initial administrative charge was filed by a member of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)." 6 The EEOC may bring suit, but not
against a government, a governmental agency, or a political subdivision.",
However, the Attorney General may bring suit against a government, a
governmental agency, or a political subdivision." 8 A federal employee may
also bring suit, but only on his own behalf or as a class representative pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). A federal employee, however,
cannot turn to either the EEOC or the Attorney General for aid in the pro-
secution of the suit.
There are two general types of Title VII cases-disparate treatment and
disparate impact. In a disparate treatment suit, the employee alleges that he
has been treated less favorably than his peers because of race, sex, or some
other statutorily expressed immutable characteristic. The plaintiff is required
to prove discriminatory animus.' In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff
alleges that a facially neutral test or employment criterion disproportionately
disqualifies a protected class from employment, promotion, etc. Proof of
discriminatory motive is not required.2 0
An example of the possible application of Title VII to the use of tests for
genetic screening is where a black job applicant is denied employment
113. See, e.g., Brown v. Evening News Ass'n, 473 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
114. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d 221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982).
115. For a helpful discussion and outline of prelitigation procedures for federal and
nonfederal employees, see C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CIVIL
RIGHTS Acriojs IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, A-15 through A-19 (rev. ed. 1984).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
117. See id. § 2000e-5(f). See, e.g., EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 599 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir.
1979), aff'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1982). The circuits have split on the question of whether the At-
torney General has the independent authority to institute a pattern or practice suit against a
public employer without the case being referred by the EEOC. Compare United States v. Board
of Educ., Garfield Heights, 581 F.2d 791, 791-92 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832
(1979) (no independent authority) with United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 592 F.2d
1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979) (independent authority).
119. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
120. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977).
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because he possesses the sickle-cell trait and the job is in a recognized high-
risk area. The hypothetical applicant should be able to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination against the employer because the tests have a disparate
impact on his race.
After the applicant in this hypothetical case establishes discrimination
based on disparate impact, the employer shoulders the burden of justifying
the screening process by demonstrating its relation to legitimate job re-
quirements or business necessity.2" Such defenses embody the fundamental
principle that Title VII does not proscribe all types of discrimination. There
are unavoidable standards for employment in certain jobs. For example, truck
drivers need good eyesight. These standards are called bona fide occupational
qualifications (BFOQs) and have a relation to legitimate job requirements.
The BFOQs defense was intended as a narrow exception to the general rule
against discrimination. The criteria for judging a BFOQs defense were ex-
plicated in Arritt v. Grissel'22 :
[T]he burden is on the employer to show (1) that the bfoq which it
invokes is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business...
and (2) that the employer has reasonable cause, i.e., a factual
basis for believing that all or substantially all persons within the
class ... would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to
deal with persons . . . on an individual basis. 23
The employer in the hypothetical case must base a BFOQs defense on suf-
ficient facts establishing that substantially all hypersusceptible employees or
applicants are unable to safely and effectively perform the functions required
by the job and, thus, pose a substantial risk to the employer's business."'
The courts generally have not recognized a BFOQs defense when based on
potential harm to the applicant or employee; rather, the courts have required
the employer to show a substantial safety risk to the public or
co-employees.' 25 Genetic screening does not protect the public or co-
employees from harm. Moreover, the genetic tests identify only those who
possess the hypersusceptible trait; the tests do not identify those who will ac-
tually contract the occupational disease. Therefore, a BFOQs defense should
fail to justify the use of genetic screening in the hypothetical case of the black
applicant with the sickle-cell trait.
121. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. See generally Note, supra note 58, at 1203-07.
122. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
123. Id. at 1271.
124. See Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices in Hazardous Industries: Protection or
Discrimination?, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 97, 146-47 (1978) (employer must prove that plan is
necessary to preserve essence of business operation).
125. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 124-25; Note, supra note 58, at 1207; Crowell &
Copus, Safety and Equity at Odds: OSHA and Title VII Clash over Health Hazards in the
Workplace, 2 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 567, 583 (1978).
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A few states prohibit the use of tests to determine whether an individual
has the sickle-cell trait.' 26 One state, New Jersey, prohibits discrimination
because of an individual's "atypical hereditary cellular blood trait." '2 7 This
latter statute purports to proscribe the use of many types of biogenetic
screening in the employment context.
There are several disadvantages to the use of Title VII to address the many
issues generated by genetic testing. For example, Title VII does not give the
EEOC rule-making authority; thus, the determination of whether a genetic
test is accurate and predictive would be left to the adversarial process . 2
Moreover, a finding that discrimination on the basis of a person's atypical
genetic makeup violates Title VII will, in all likelihood, snuff out the
technology. Such a result may not be beneficial when these tests are
developed. Finally, because the determination of whether Title VII is ap-
plicable to genetic screening is left for the courts to grapple with, one cannot
help but be reminded of the old adage that such grappling is akin to fitting a
square peg into a round hole.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against handi-
capped individuals by employers who receive federal assistance or who are
government contractors. 29 Its expressed purpose is "to develop and imple-
ment, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal oppor-
tunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation
and independent living."' 30 Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to
federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, including the Postal
Service and the Postal Rate Commission.' Section 503 applies to employers
with federal contracts in excess of $2,500.' 32 Section 504 applies to recipients
of federal financial assistance such as state and local governments.' 33 Section
504 contains no requisite monetary amount of financial assistance, unlike
section 503.
For the Rehabilitation Act to apply to genetic testing, the courts would
first have to determine whether a predisposition to an occupational illness is
a handicap. A "handicapped individual" is defined broadly to include "any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
impairment, or (ii) is regarded as having such an impairment.'1 3
126. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 128. Florida, North Carolina, and Louisiana prohibit
discrimination in employment based on sickle-cell trait. See also M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at
118.
127. N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:5-12(a) (Supp. 1986). See also M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 118.
128. See June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 127 (remarks by Mark Rothstein).
129. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 and Supp. I 1984).
130. M. ROTHSrEIN, supra note 7, at 114.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982).
132. Id. § 793.
133. Id. § 794.
134. Id. § 706(7)(B); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 (1986). See also June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at
114 (report by General Accounting OFfice).
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The Supreme Court recently construed, the definition of "handicapped"
under the Rehabilitation Act in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v.
Arline.I3 There the Court grappled with the question of whether a person af-
flicted with the contagious disease of tuberculosis may be considered a
"handicapped individual." The Court observed that the basic purpose of sec-
tion 504 is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or
other benefits because of the ignorance or prejudiced attitudes of others.' 36
Moreover, the Court stated:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to in-
clude not only those who are actually physically impaired, but
also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are
substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknow-
ledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability
and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations
that flow from actual impairment.' 37
The Court then held "that a person suffering from the contagious disease of
tuberculosis can be a handicapped person within the meaning of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973."' 3
The courts may conclude, in light of the Court's opinion in Arline, that
hypersusceptibility because of a genetic deficiency is a handicap under the
Act. Although the hypersusceptible individual may never acquire the disease,
his employer may nevertheless regard him as having the disease. "High-risk
or susceptible individuals are not presently impaired, but they are likely to
become impaired, or, at least, are believed to be more likely to become im-
paired in the future."' 139
After determining that hypersusceptibility due to a genetic deficiency is a
handicap as defined by the Act, the court must still determine whether an in-
dividual with the present ability to do the work required but with a future
risk of illness is "otherwise qualified.' '"40 An otherwise qualified person is
one who is able to perform the "essential functions" of the job in
question.'' Generally, a determination whether a person is otherwise
qualified requires an individualized inquiry based on reasonable medical
judgments given the state of medical knowledge.'4 2
Finally, it is not clear when an employer would be justified in using genetic
screening procedures in the employment process or whether reasonable ac-
135. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
136. Id. at 1128.
137. Id. at 1129 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 1132.
139. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 118. See also OTA REPORT. supra note 2, at 128-29.
Although no complaints have been filed under the Act, Justice Department officials have in-
dicated hypersusceptible individuals are protected by the Act, especially if the employer perceives
the genetic trait as a handicap. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 117.
140. An individual who is "otherwise qualified" is "one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
141. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.17. See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1986).
142. See Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
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commodation of the individual may be possible. Even if an employer could
prove that genetic screening is predictive and job related, the employer may
not be permitted to exclude a hypersusceptible individual if reasonable ac-
commodation is possible, such as job restructuring or modifying work
schedules. 143
Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable
accommodation for a handicapped employee. Although they are
not required to find another job for an employee who is not
qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an
employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably
available under the employer's existing policies.' 44
There are several shortcomings in applying the Rehabilitation Act to the
use of genetic screening in employment. The Act provides no private right of
action under section 503 for an aggrieved individual. The remedy provided
for under section 503 is the filing of a complaint with the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs in the Department of Labor, which must
then investigate the allegation. 14S Potential plaintiffs could not sue their
employers directly. Furthermore, a major shortcoming with the Rehabilita-
tion Act is that for the Act to apply to the use of genetic screening in employ-
ment, the courts must first determine that a genetic predisposition to a possi-
ble future occupational illness is a handicap, and, second, that the "hand-
icapped" individual is "otherwise qualified" for the job. These determina-
tions are not appropriate for the courts to make; rather, these determinations
should be made by Congress and its state counterparts.
In deciding whether hypersusceptibility is a handicap, one must address
general policy questions and should amass numerous facts. This process is
one best reserved for a legislature. The ad hoc and retrospective process,
which is the essence of the American judicial system, is improper to resolve
the issues of an emerging technology. Courts are ill-equipped to deal with
emerging technologies. This shortcoming is not due to incompetence but to
the nature of the American judicial system. Courts exercise the power of
reasoned elaboration. They, unlike the legislature, must exert their power on
a case-by-case basis. Therefore, although the courts may be headed in the
right direction, it necessarily takes them longer to reach a policy objective
than it would the legislature. Unfortunately, society may not have the luxury
of time when confronted with the hazards of an emerging technology.
An ad hoc and retrospective approach to the issues presented by genetic
screening will be burdensome on the courts and unfair to those employers,
143. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 130. An accommodation is not reasonable if it im-
poses undue financial or administrative hardship on the employer. See Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131
n.17. Generally, state fair employment practice laws do not require reasonable accommodation.
OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 130. See also June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 24.
144. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.19 (citations omitted).
145. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1982); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1986). See also OTA REPORT,
supra note 2, at 126.
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employees, and job applicants who were not parties to the particular case
before the court. Courts will have to wrestle with many complex issues, such
as when does a test become scientifically acceptab!e and what will be the
societal ramifications when a decision is handed down. Courts must by their
very nature decide the cases before them and do not have the luxuries af-
forded the legislature, such as endless hours of expert testimony or the discre-
tion to avoid the issues entirely. Decisions by the courts on the issues
presented by genetic screening will be unfair to those parties who are not
before the court at that particular time. Of course, the courts could try to
alleviate the problem of unfairness by permitting the filing of amicus curiae
briefs, but this procedure is not comparable to the notice and comment pro-
cedures in the administrative process. Amicus briefs are not the proper pro-
cedure by which to amass the information necessary to resolve the novel
issues generated by the genetic technologies.
Furthermore, an ad hoc and retrospective approach to the problems
associated with an emerging technology will not allow the various actors the
opportunity to privately order their policies.'" Employers and employees will
not be aware of their rights and duties until a decision is handed down.
Moreover, employers will not invest in a technology that may be discon-
tinued the next day. Finally, the judicial system must react to the harms
caused by a technology. It is axiomatic that federal courts cannot render ad-
visory opinions. They must wait until an individual fears harm and seeks an
injunction or is actually harmed and brings a suit for damages. Action by
Congress would be the proper procedure for dealing with an emerging
technology and would provide uniformity in the handling of the issues
presented by the use of genetic screening in employment.
A Regulatory Proposal
This article demonstrates that the existing legal framework is inadequate in
meeting the challenges of genetic screening. Leaving these complex policy
questions to the adversarial process is improper in these circumstances. The
courts presently have no well-defined administrative agency to defer to on
such issues as when a genetic test is valid and reliable or when such a test
should be required.' 7 Thus, the courts would eventually have to confront the
merits of questions like this through the use of "[t]he instrumentality
nominally charged with bringing science into the court-the expert
witness-[who] performs that task highly imperfectly in the adversary set-
ting."'"4 However, a more fundamental problem exists if the courts are per-
146. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAK-
ING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 124-80 (tent. ed. 1958).
147. See Abraham & Merrill, Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, 2 ISSUES 93, 94-95 (1986).
Abraham and Merrill discuss the three judicial stances toward uncertainty-confrontation,
avoidance, and deference. They observe that the dominant method of dealing with uncertainty in
the regulatory context is deference to an administrative judgment. Id. at 95.
148. Burger, Scientific Fact and Legal Decisions, in THE LEGAL SYSTEM ASSAULT ON THE
ECONOMY 39, 46 (Mink ed. 1986) (citation omitted).
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mitted to resolve the issues generated by the use of genetic testing in the first
instance. Courts are not, nor ever have been, repositories of "the truth."
Courts have never claimed as much. This is not to say that truth is unimpor-
tant. "Truth is, of course, a goal of the judicial system, but it is only one
goal, and rarely the main one."'' 49 Truth is as important to achieve as certain
other societal goals, such as the protection of constitutional values (e.g., the
fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules), the attorney-client privilege,
fairness, and equity. 50
"Scientific material fits poorly in adversary proceedings without special
handling. There is a substantial and important distinction between
'winning'-the goal of adversary parties-and 'finding the truth'-the tradi-
tional goal of those who do science. '1'5 Moreover, as an adversarial pro-
ceeding, "the system relies almost entirely on the parties to present the
evidence and contentions in support of their respective positions, with little if
any outside assistance.' '15 2 By necessity this leads to what is commonly called
the "battle of experts" testifying before a court dubbed by one commentator
a "national disgrace.""' Yet, by the very nature of the American legal
system, a paradox arises. The courts are ill-equipped in resolving many of the
scientific issues they face; however, they must decide those issues when the
proper cases are before them. Courts are not permitted unbridled discretion
in avoidance of issues. Thus, the courts, without congressional action, must
eventually address the issues generated by genetic screening even if they are
ill-equipped to do So.'54
Congress is the appropriate branch of government to explore the issues
associated with the genetic-testing technologies. Congress must be prepared
to take thoughtful action, either by enacting new legislation or by amending
existing legislation. Any action by Congress should consider the various ob-
jectives of the regulatory model proposed in this article.
Active Involvement in Development of Technology
Congress should take an active role in the development of the technology
not only by directly regulating genetic testing but also by funding research to
develop tests with high reliability and validity. The federal government "has
an interest in seeing the biotechnology industry prosper, not only because of
the specific products that will emerge from the industry but because of the
149. Wessel, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Socioscientific Dispute, 1 J.L. & TEcH. 1,
5 (1986).
150. Id. Cf. Burger, supra note 148, at 47.
151. Burger, supra note 148, at 39.
152. Wessel, supra note 149, at 13.
153. Id. at 5.
154. This obs.-rvation is far from novel. To compensate for this judicial inadequacy, there
have been several proposals to create alternate tribunals for adjudication of scientific issues. For
a thoughtful and interesting proposal for a "socioscientific dispute resolution" procedure, see
Wessel, supra' note 149, at 13. For a criticism of such proposals, see Abraham & Merrill, supra
note 147, at 106.
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broad economic benefits to be expected of a vibrant and expanding industrial
sector."' 55 Strong government involvement can also help to build the public
trust essential for industries perceived as potentially hazardous. 56 Such a role
is symbolic but no less real or important. Congress, possibly through
NIOSH, should also fund epidemiological studies in occupational settings to
study the correlation between genetic traits and an increased risk for con-
tracting certain diseases.
History teaches that when the government backs the development of a new
technology, the technology explodes on the scene and its acceptance by the
public is generally forthcoming. Some examples are radar, radio, fluoridated
water, and computers. Thus, federal funding should rapidly aid in the
development of this technology with its many potential benefits.
Monitor and Evaluate
Congress should provide for a system of monitoring the genetic screening
technology so as to gather methodology on the use of the tests. This monitor-
ing process will help to pierce the veil of secrecy that has surrounded the use
of genetic screening in employment. In this manner, Congress would pro-
mote the technology indirectly.
Congress should also delegate to an agency the authority to establish
criteria on how specific tests are to be evaluated for accuracy and reliability.
Moreover, guidelines should be established on the proper procedures in giv-
ing the tests and evaluating the results, as well as when to require screening.
Congress could delegate the authority to monitor and evaluate genetic tests
to NIOSH,'" but such delegation creates a paradox when coupled with
NIOSH's proposed role in promoting the technology. The regulatory model
saddles NIOSH with conflicting regulatory roles. NIOSH is required, on the
one hand, to foster and promote genetic testing while, on the other, to guard
individual rights against unscientific testing. This tension, of course, is not
new in the regulatory context. The Atomic Energy Commission was both the
promoter and the guardian of the public with regard to nuclear power. It
would be more desirable, however, to delegate the authority to promote
genetic technologies to an agency different from the agency charged with its
regulation. Thus, any actual or perceived conflict in the proposed roles is
eliminated. Congress may want to create anew agency for the funding of all
genetic technologies (including genetic testing) while delegating the monitor-
ing function to NIOSH.
Regulation of Test Use
The third objective of any legislation should be to directly regulate the use
of those specific tests that have been found to be accurate and reliable. This
objective envisions a two-pronged approach. First, the regulation should be
155. S. OLSON, BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE 67 (1986).
156. Id. at 68.
157. Accord M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 205.
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structured so as to provide information on the dangers of the workplace
primarily to the employee and job applicant. An educational program funded
by the employer, any union, and the government to inform employees and
applicants of the risks associated with a particular occupation when such an
individual has been diagnosed as hypersusceptible would be consistent with
this requirement. Test results would be interpreted and the ramifications
discussed.' Necessarily, a new but analogous duty is conferred on "the
physician to explain fully and in terms comprehensible to the person what
having that genetic condition does and does not mean for that individual."'"
Therefore, the test results would be used by the employees and applicants to
make informed decisions as to whether they will accept the risks of possible
future illness. If the employees choose to accept the risk, they should be
given every reasonable protection. '"
The second prong of this objective is the implementation of the policy that
the employee or applicant has the final say on whether to accept the risks
associated with employment."' There are no ethical problems with allowing
individuals, to voluntarily assume the risks of future illness if the individuals
are adequately informed of the genetic test results." 2 Society often permits
the voluntary assumption of risk in the safety and health context. Individuals
are permitted to choose to smoke, dip snuff, drink alcohol, and operate coke
ovens, and the list goes on. Inherent in all these actions is the voluntary
assumption of a known risk.
Another justification for permitting the individual to assess the benefits
and risks demonstrated by genetic tests is inherent in the nature of the tests.
Genetic screening cannot determine whether an individual is in fact going to
contract the illness. Genetic screening, instead, identifies an individual who is
158. Id. at 198.
159. Oct. 1982 Hearing, supra note 25, at 91.
160. Accord M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 198. Professor Rothstein does state that if the
employees choose to accept the risk, "they should be given every possible protection." Id. (em-
phasis added). Read in its appropriate context, the phrase means an employee should receive
every reasonable protection possible. To the extent that Professor Rothstein meant that such
employees receive every possible protection without temperance by reason or feasibility, this
author disagrees.
161. The lerm "risk" in this context has several implications. By employing the term "risks,"
one necessarily implies that it can be weighed objectively against the "benefits" of a proposed
plan of action.
A willingness to balance relative costs and benefits is present in the very adop-
tion of the concept of risk to describe one's situation. In contrast, this disposition
to weigh and compare is not announced by the concepts of danger, peril, hazard,
and threat. Such terms do not presuppose that the source of possible injury is also
a source of benefits. What does one do with a risk? Sometimes one decides to take
it. What, by comparison, does one do with a hazard? Usually, one seeks to avoid it
or eliminate it.
Winner, The Risk of Talking About Risk, 6 PHIL. & PUB. POL. 12 (1986).
162. For a helpful article on voluntary vis a vis involuntary assumption of risk, see Starr,
Social Benefit vs. Technological Risk, 16 Sci. 1232, 1232-38 (1969). Starr explores the different
expectations and reactions people have toward voluntary and involuntary assumption of risk. Id.
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a member of a class of persons who may be more susceptible to a given ill-
ness. Even as a member of a hypersusceptible class, an individual may never
contract the illness. Of course, it would be unfair to exclude such an in-
dividual from employment. Nevertheless, this would be the result if Congress
embraces a general policy of allowing the exclusion of hypersusceptible
workers so as to protect them.
The experts should not decide what is in the best interests of an individual
in these circumstances. Genetic expertise does not give an expert any special
qualifications to determine the rules of society.' 63 Science cannot be per-
mitted to dominate the law.'64 The individual is in the best position to weigh
the benefits of employment against the risks of possible future illness in
deciding whether to accept or to continue employment.
Scientists and engineers have an important role to play in the
making of safety determinations. Representatives of these
disciplines are obviously better equipped than others to identify
and quantify potential risks and to identify potential benefits. It is
questionable, however, whether they have any special competence
to qualify benefits in a manner that can be regarded as
authoritative in the formulation of public policy. No elite group
of experts, no matter how broadly constituted, has the ability to
make an objective and valid determination with respect to what
benefits people want and what risks people are willing to assume
in order to have those benefits.' 61
The use of genetic screening to transfer or exclude individuals without their
consent can be a dispassionate process. The use of genetic screening in this
manner will have adverse effects on rights such as individual freedom and
self-determination. This adverse effect on well-recognized rights is generally
considered by the experts in a risk-benefit assessment. However, loss of
freedom is difficult to quantify and, at this early stage in the development of
the genetic technology, would probably be underweighed relative to the
perceived benefits of employee safety and health.' 66 Moreover, such a
calculus can "obscure the fact that most risk decisions involve gambling with
people's health, safety, and economic well-being in an arena with diverse ac-
tors and shifting alliances."' 67 Therefore, it must fall to the individuals in-
163. See Wessell, supra note 149, at 8.
164. See generally Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE
L.J. 639, 691-97 (1986).
165. Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determination, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 791,
792 (1975).
166. "IT]echnology assessment, especially in the early stages of a technology, likely will
overweigh benefits and underweigh risks." Green, Should Technology Assessment Guide Public
Policy?, 69 A.B.A. J. 930, 932 (1983). Dean Green observes that "the identification of potential
risk is largely in the realm of speculation, and the degree of foreseeable potential harm that will
result if the risks turn out to be real is almost always in the realm of uncertainty." Id. at 931.
167. Fischoff, Managing Risk Perceptions, 2 IssuEs 83, 86 (1985).
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volved to weigh the benefits against the risks.'68 There is no justification for
experts or employers to make a risk assessment decision for an individual
when that individual is in the best position to make it. ' 9
A troubling problem arises if society permits the individual to assume the
enhanced risk of contracting an occupational illness. When an individual ex-
ercises his prerogative and accepts employment, should his employer be
shielded from a worker's compensation claim if the individual contracts the
occupational illness? The better answer is no. "The employer takes the
employee as lie finds him."' 10 An employee should retain his right to file
worker's compensation claims for an occupational illness that arose out of
his employment. 17'
Confidenti'litv
A further objective of any legislation should be to protect the confiden-
tiality and privacy of job applicants and employees by restricting access to
any genetic information obtained from the results of genetic screening. One
proposal concludes that any results from genetic screening should not be
given to unrelated third parties, such as insurers or employers, without the
explicit consent of the individual screened.' 72 This proposal may go too far.
Unions have an interest in knowing the number of hypersusceptible
employees they represent. Union access to such records can be accomplished
easily and may even be mandated under certain labor laws. Moreover,
employers have an important interest in knowing whether their employees are
hypersusceptible so as to provide for reasonable accommodation if possible.
Furthermore, employer access to genetic results allows an employer to take
greater preventive measures in certain areas. The fear of employer access, of
course, is real. Theoretically, an employer could use the genetic screening
results to exclude applicants and employees from employment.
168. This proposition can be analogized to the common law right of self-autonomy, the
bedrock of the informed consent law in medical jurisprudence. See generally T. BEAUCHAMP &
J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 62-82 (1979). For an interesting discussion of
the potential cor flict between worker autonomy and the policies embodied in the OSH Act, see
M. ROTHSTEIN, r!upra note 7, at 200-01.
169. An indivdual's risk assessment need not be an all or nothing proposition. An individual
need not decide whether to accept or reject employment; a regulatory model could also provide a
requirement that if an individual rejects a particular position, he be reasonably accommodated
by his prospective employer. Such a result is, of course, the best case scenario. However, such a
result may be more theoretical than practical.
170. M. RoT-STEIN, supra note 7, at 171 (quoting I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW § 12.20, at 3-25 (1980 & Supp. 1982)).
171. In employing this analysis, an implicit assumption is made that even this author must take issue
with; that is that worker's compensation awards are adequate in handling the expenses necessitated by
the occupational illness. In their present state of decline, worker's compensation laws cannot
perform this task. The laws, in general, are inadequate and inequitable. See id. at 169-70.
172. See June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 114 (statement of Alexander M. Capron, Ex-
ecutive Director of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research on Genetic Screening in the Workplace). This objective
has been suggested by the President's Commission. Id.
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Even more disturbing than the intracompany disclosure of
medical records is the considerable risk that these same medical
records will be widely available to various third parties through
one of the vast computerized networks dealing with private
medical records. Some employers already have established pro-
cedures for exchanging medical surveillance records of workers
known to have had prior exposures to hazardous substances.
There are even reports that some companies compile lists of
workers who have filed work injury lawsuits, which are made
available to employers for use in screening employment applica-
tions.'73
However, such action should be unlawful. After all, an employer is aware of
the race of an applicant. If the employer refuses to hire the applicant based
on race, the employer is subject to suit under Title VII. Moreover, any fear
of employer abuse may be tempered with guidelines as to what information
can be obtained and from whom it can be obtained. Furthermore, an in-
dividual who has been tested should also have a right of access to the test
results and any explanations accompanying them. 7
Explicit Private Right of Action
The final objective of any legislation should be to expressly provide for a
private right of action by an aggrieved individual against an employer or
union who has used any genetic test results to exclude an individual from
employment or membership in a union, or against any person who has
breached the individual's right of confidentiality and privacy. Private en-
forcement is a desirable mechanism to ensure that the provisions of the
legislation are adequately enforced.' 75 Moreover, a private right of action
would make enforcement of any rights independent of the political process.
A helpful procedural model would be that provided for under Title VII.' 76
173. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 92 (footnotes omitted).
174. Employees (but not applicants) do have access to exposure and medical records under
OSHA standards; however, OSHA does not place on the employer an affirmative duty to
disclose the records. Id. at 89, 91. Moreover, most employers deny access to employees outright.
Id.
Whether genetic test results could or should be obtained by relatives of an individual tested is
beyond the scope of this article. See generally June 1982 Hearing, supra note 6, at 114. Cf. Fran-
cis, Recent Development in Genetic Diagnosis: Some Ethical and Legal Implications, 1986 UTAH
L. REV. 483, 487-89 (discussing the ethical problems that arise if the genetic information has im-
plications for other individuals).
175. For a thorough discussion of the private enforcement of law through class actions, see
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669
(1984). Professor Coffee suggests that the present system "creates the potential for both oppor-
tunism and overenforcement." Id. at 679 (footnote omitted).
176. Accord M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 206.
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Conclusion
The foregoing examination of the relevant statutory authority demon-
strates that although there are principles applicable to the novel issues
generated by the use of genetic screening in employment, the current legal
framework: is inadequate to deal with those issues satisfactorily. Each
statutory scheme holds promise; however, alone, each system is fundamen-
tally deficient.
Presently, there is no congressional policy directed at the use of genetic
testing in the workplace. The need for a congressional policy is compelling.
Genetic-testing programs are a present reality, not a distant prospect that is
sufficiently far away to allow years for exploring their scientific, legal, and
ethical implications. There is no pressing emergency, yet no time to delay. It
is important that Congress protect individuals from the abuses of genetic
screening, but it must also foster and promote the technology.
This decade has catapulted the legal and political systems into a confronta-
tion with many emerging technologies. It is now time for a candid discussion
about the legal and ethical issues spawned by genetic testing. The new
genetic-screening capabilities present great scientific promise as well as pos-
sible hazards. Genetic testing has the potential to identify hypersusceptible
individuals and allow them to assess the risks and benefits of employment.
Nevertheless, the use of genetic screening may also be abused by excluding
individuals from employment, thus creating a class of unemployables.
Genetic testing is a technology too promising to discontinue, yet it is too
potentially harmful for unchecked development.
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